Dialogue - "Holy Insecurity" by Lubarsky, Sandra & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
Lubarsky, Sandra (1996)  “Dialogue: Holy Insecurity,” Religious Education (special issue on “Religious Traditions in 
Conversation), Fall, 1996, pp. 540-546. (ISSN: 0034-4087) The version of record is published by Taylor & Francis 
available online: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/0034408960910413 
 
Dialogue: "Holy Insecurity" 
Sandra B. Lubarsky 
 
The war in Bosnia and the particularly tragic example of Sarajevo evoke the mournful 
question: What does it take for people of different traditions to live together in peace? It 
is part of our modern condition that we are surprised again and again—sadly and 
bitterly surprised—to learn that peace is not necessarily secured by living together in 
communities and neighborhoods, nor even in marriages. 
We learned this before when the Jews of pre-World War II Europe, like the inhabitants 
of Sarajevo, mistakenly believed that shared community identity, intercultural 
commerce, intermarriage, and the rules of civility were sufficient ingredients for peace. 
To them, too, it was an enormous shock (despite the presence of continued anti-
Semitism) to have their neighbors turn against them, even against those who had 
embraced their neighbors' faith. The Holocaust has been attributed, in part, to the failure 
of Jewish emancipation. It might be more broadly read as an example of one of the 
many failings of modernity. Sarajevo is another instance. 
The particular aspect of modernity to which I refer is the modern belief that peace relies 
simply on the goodwill of people toward one another, goodwill that is based on an 
appreciation for the individual. Though the modernist position espoused tolerance, it 
was tolerance based on "sameness," as postmodernism has made clear. "I will treat you 
with respect, because you are an individual—like me—and only as long as you are 'like 
me.'" When the assumed but unspoken clause, "like me," or "like the majority culture" is 
exposed, so too is the feebleness of the connection that obtains in spite of our 
differences, rather than in relation to them. Such "tolerance" is too closely related to the 
inclusive form of absolutism, where the worth of another tradition is affirmed only insofar 
as it corresponds to the one completely true faith. 
Theoretically, modernity bracketed out religious convictions and made an argument for 
equality on the basis of a universal reason. The promise was that all are equal without 
regard to their religious beliefs. But in actual fact, religion did not disappear as a dividing 
point between people. In the case of Western European Jews, what became invisible 
was not religion in general, but their particular Jewishness. Equality was not the 
birthright given by reason to humanity. Instead it was the gift of the majority culture to 
the minority, on the condition that the minority embrace secularism—or better yet, 
baptism. One of the failures of modernity is that it did not live up to its promise to 
respect individuals as truly individual. 
It is easy to live well with those who are like us. The challenge lies, as the poet Wendell 
Berry notes, in doing "something that won't compute," in loving "someone who does not 
deserve it," in giving "approval to all you cannot understand (Roberts and Amidon 1991, 
122-23). This requires a move beyond the belief system of modernity, to a place where 
the individual is loved in all of his or her remarkable singularity, and not as 
representative of a particular form of universality. One of the challenges for people in a 
postmodern era is to acknowledge the profusion of qualities that distinguishes one 
individual from another, including religion, and yet to give respect to another. This 
requires real dialogue about differences, dialogue that is potentially transformative of its 
participants who, having encountered value outside of their own home, feel compelled 
to reshape their personal convictions. We have begun to understand that unexamined 
lives are vulnerable lives, vulnerable to the neighbor who is ignorant, indifferent, or 
arrogant. 
When "two people of very deep faith" choose to "listen attentively and empathetically to 
the other's sharing of faith" dialogue begins. But the kind of dialogue that pushes 
beyond tolerance and even beyond appreciation of the other, the kind of dialogue that 
leads to transformative understanding, requires more than attentiveness and empathy, 
though these are essential. Mary Boys and Sara Lee have named a number of 
additional characteristics, as have Leonard Swidler and other important voices in 
interreligious dialogue. At the risk of being repetitive, but for the purpose of emphasizing 
the strenuous nature of transformative dialogue, I will set out some of the psychological 
and metaphysical assumptions that enable such dialogues to occur. 
 
Psychological and Metaphysical Perspectives on Dialogue 
From the perspective of a process metaphysics, it is in the nature of things to change. 
Since transformation is ongoing and unavoidable, when any two people meet, change 
will occur regardless of what is said or not. But change consciously chosen—the 
willingness to be transformed when confronted with certain propositions, events, or 
presences—is indispensable to transformative dialogue. Among people who are 
religiously committed, the "willingness to be transformed" is perhaps the affective side 
of commitment to a power greater than themselves that in its fullness they acknowledge 
to be beyond their complete comprehension. The admission that God, truth, beauty, or 
love might play a more extensive role in the world than one has experienced for oneself 
and that there are thus creative outcomes that one has not yet experienced, leads to an 
openness to new propositions and to inquiry rather than certitude. 
Because of this initial commitment to an authority that transcends the individual's full 
knowledge, it is, I think, possible even for absolutists to enter a dialogical relationship. If 
they listen attentively and empathetically to one another and with a sustained 
awareness of the unlimited nature of ultimacy (and their own limited understanding of it), 
then there is the opening for real dialogue. 
As Boys and Lee emphasize, the "presence" of the other is a crucial element of 
interreligious learning. But "presence" alone is not sufficient. Dialogue requires a 
particular quality, a "felt presence," as it were. To borrow the terms of Martin Buber, the 
other who is experienced as "Thou" is not accidental to me, not simply a curiosity—that 
which I am not—but a possibility—that which I might become. In such an encounter, 
both persons are subjects and yet both are "for-each-other"; there are no Its. Thus, 
even in their "objectivity," in their being "for-each-other," both persons are perceived as 
"subjects." In this kind of meeting, in the presence of the other who is perceived as 
"Thou," we find the possibility of dialogue that deepens both our own subjectivity and 
our internal relatedness. 
Participants in the Catholic-Jewish Colloquium drew upon the virtues of courage, 
honesty, generosity, and patience as they engaged in a dialogue. All of these are 
important conditions for transformative dialogue but especially courage—courage to be 
honest, generous, patient and, above all, vulnerable. For there is a great deal of risk 
involved in dialogue that is potentially transformative. In putting forward our beliefs and 
values for scrutiny and in opening ourselves to another world view, we become 
vulnerable to ourselves and our communities. It takes courage to enter the process, 
courage to redefine ourselves in response to new insights, courage to "side" at times 
with another tradition, courage to find ourselves sometimes marginalized in our own 
traditions. It leads, as one participant noted, "on a journey that has no script and that is 
really frightening. . . and that on some basic level you understand [as] recrafting a whole 
sense of self." For such courage to be manifested, participants in dialogue must hold an 
abiding belief that something really important is at stake. 
Transformative dialogue can be simultaneously destabilizing and strengthening. To be 
thrown "off center" can be strengthening when the ego is marginalized and the ultimate 
returned to centrality, or when the "stability" that is revoked had been conservative, 
unresponsive, and narrow. If by "strengthened" we mean "made more alive," then the 
person who in dialogue becomes more open, sensitive, and aware is indeed 
strengthened. Yet at the same time, that person is made more fragile. If the goal of 
religious traditions is not impenetrability or indestructibility, but receptivity to truth and 
beauty, then it is the tender strength of the butterfly, not the stone, that is to be valued. 
Increased openness, sensitivity and awareness cannot be confined; in opening 
ourselves to one person in dialogue, we open ourselves to many. One of the most 
important consequences of dialogue is that there is no exclusivity of relationships; the 
change that occurs in one relationship is generalized so that we are never the same in 
our meetings with others. In crossing one barrier, we cross many. Part of "what 
happens" in dialogue is that the meaning that arises becomes part of our interpretation 
of life beyond the particular moment of dialogue. 
What we learn is added to our other efforts to understand the whole of life. In this sense 
dialogue is a "meaning-making" enterprise. It is a significant means by which we verify 
our own realities as well as enlarge upon them. If, as Victor Frankl held, the "will to 
meaning" is part of our psychological makeup, our encounter with the other is part of our 
journey to wholeness. 
Perhaps the most destabilizing possibility inherent in transformative dialogue is that it 
may give rise to the question about the "essence" of our traditions of faith. In dialogue 
we do not simply open ourselves to new truths or new interpretations of truth, or to 
ideas that are not now present in our traditions or are present in different forms. We also 
open ourselves to the need to develop new patterns of explanation, values, behavior, 
language and liturgy. How much can we restructure our traditions before they are no 
longer our traditions, but something new and something else? What are the boundaries 
beyond which we cannot cross and still call ourselves Jews or Christians? There are 
some who, as a result of their experience of dialogue, will reach the conclusion that 
there is no essential core to a religious tradition. John B. Cobb, Jr., the well-known 
Christian theologian argues for such an understanding of Christianity; for many, his 
words are unsettling: 
Christianity has no essence. There is no doctrine, no set of values, no way of life, 
no ecclesiastical practice, no mode of being in the world, that defines what 
Christianity always and at all places must be. Christianity is a living community 
that has its identity from remembering a shared history. But which features of that 
history are emphasized, how they are interpreted, what implications are drawn 
from them—all changes (Cobb 1996, 233). 
The idea that there is no essence to a particular religion is a destabilizing revelation. In 
our desire to define ourselves we tend to value the substantial over the transient, the 
enduring over the momentary. Identity gets entangled with security, so much so that we 
give more attention to the elements of stability than to the elements of novelty in our 
lives. But dialogue shifts the emphasis from fixity to change. 
For people "of very deep faith" who enter into dialogue, perhaps the most strenuous 
part of the process comes when we ask what we are to do with the insights we have 
gained, how we are to incorporate them into our lives and yet remain faithful to our 
traditions. Having learned that another's tradition is not clearly more flawed than our 
own, having recognized the depth and diversity within another tradition, and having 
sensed the power of another tradition and the great possibilities for goodness that might 
and do come from it, what are we now to do? Having begun to read history from another 
direction, having become sensitive to the language of those in our tradition who 
disparage the other, having begun to critically examine our own tradition in response to 
our encounter with another tradition, where will our learning take us? We cannot 
necessarily recommit to our previous religious understanding or to our home 
congregations, and this can be the cause of pain and isolation. We find that we have to 
reshape our traditions in a way that perhaps has not been done before and we ask 
anew, "What are the boundaries that define our tradition?" 
We cannot look to the modern world view for help in this regard, with its emphasis on 
enduring objects as most real and its definition of the individual as a being who is 
fundamentally independent of the rest of the world. Instead we must renew our 
affirmation of the social nature of all life, reverse the Aristotelian science that says that 
relations are secondary and affirm instead that we are constituted by our relations. We 
must remember with Whitehead that "the art of persistence is to be dead" (Whitehead 
1958, 4). We must value our experiences of interconnectedness and novelty that come 
to us in a heightened form in dialogue with another. 
The idea of replacing "essence" with "relation" and "process" can be deeply disorienting. 
Indeed, disorientation is a part of any creative process. But if our commitment is to a 
power greater than our selves that cannot be contained either in our intellectual or 
religious constructs and we experience in dialogue evidence of this power, we can find 
ourselves profoundly rededicated to our newly understood faith. We may recommit 
ourselves in faith to the responsive God who calls for response, to the creative acts of 
God and others in the world, to relationships with God and all others whose vitality must 
be encountered anew at each moment. It is this kind of recommitment that invigorates 
our traditions. But it also leads to what Buber terms "holy insecurity" (Friedman 1976). 
The price that we pay for responsiveness and creativity is a loss of security. Religion is 
not only a cradle in which we calm our fears but a way of participating in the creativity 
that surrounds and infuses us and, yes, confuses us. Though we deeply desire 
security—of knowledge, of continued life, of love—it cannot be ours except 
paradoxically as we embrace creativity and its source. Dialogue with people of different 
faiths heightens the ambiguity in our lives because it is part and parcel of the creative 
action that defines life itself. 
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